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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

ROBERT L. 1\icMULLIN,
Appellant and Plaintiff
vs.
LYNWOOD F. SHil\fMIN and JACQUIE
A. SHIMMIN,
Respondents and Defendants

Case No.

8998

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The parties to this appeal are agreed upon the facts
except as to the final ruling of the lower court. If respondents' position on that ruling is correct, there would
be no need for this appeal because plaintiff's claim for
damages would not be precluded and a new action could
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be commenced to recover them. It appears most likely,
however, that respondents would and could successfully
impose the defense of res judicata in any such new action
on the present state of the record.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
PLAINTIFF IS NOT SEEKING TO ENFORCE SPECIFIC
PERFORMANCE OF THIS CONTRACT BUT RATHER ASKING FOR THE ALTERNATIVE RELIEF FOR DAMAGES
PRAYED FOR A'T THE TIME THIS ACTION WAS COMMENCED.
-POINT H.
A SELLER SHOULD NOT BE BARRED FROM RECOVERING DAMAGES AS AN ALTERNATIVE REMEDY TO
SPE•CIFI'C PERFORMANCE BY REASON OF SELLING THE
SUBJECT PROPERTY AFTER BRINGING AN ACTION TO
ENFORCE THE CONTRACT OF SALE.
POINT III.
PLAINTIFF HAVING RETAINED THE EARNEST
MONEY SHOULD NOT BE BARRED FROM RECOVERY IN
AN ACTION AT LAW FOR DAMAGES EVEN IF THE DECISION OF ANDREASON v. HANSEN IS SOUND ON ITS
PARTICULAR FACTS.
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ARGUMENT

POINT I.
PLAINTIFF IS NOT SEEKING TO ENFORCE SPECIFIC
PERFORMANCE OF THIS CONTRACT BUT RATHER ASKING FOR THE ALTERNATIVE RELIEF FOR DAMAGES
PRAYED FOR A'T THE TIME THIS A'CTION WAS COMMENCED.

Appellant could not and does not contend that he is
entitled to a decree for specific perfonnance inas1nuch
as he was able to sell the property in question prior to
the trial of this cause in the pursuance of his business
and in mitigation of his damages and defendants' liability. Thus, the authorities cited by respondent under
this point are irrelevant in appellant's opinion. This comment with respect to the Utah case of Foxley v. Rich,
5 U 162, 99 P 666 (1909), cited by respondents, however,
ought to be made to avoid any misunderstanding that
the factual situation there was in any way comparable
to the case in question. In that case a buyer brought an
action to recover money paid on an executory contract
by reason of an alleged conveyance that made it impossible for the seller to perform the contract. He contended
that such conduct on the part of seller constituted an
abandonment and repudiation of the agreement. The
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question there was whether or not an absolute conveyance
had been made to a third party by the seller before any
breach by the buyer and before any action had been taken
to enforce the contract. Appellant has no quarrel with
the holding of that case but respectfully submits it has
no bearing in this one where the conveyance made by the<
plaintiff-seller, which admittedly was absolute, was made
only after the defendant-buyers had refused to perform
their contract and the plaintiff-seller had commenced this
action to enforce the contract.
POINT II.
A SELLER SHOULD NOT BE BARRED FROM RECOVERING DAMAGES AS AN ALTERNATIVE REMEDY TO
SPE.CIFIC PERFORMANCE BY REASON OF SELLING THE
SUBJECT PJ;tOPERTY AFTER BRINGING AN ACTION TO
ENFORCE THE CONTRACT OF SALE.

The crucial issue in this appeal is whether or not the
following staten1ent from respondent's brief on page 8
is a correct statement. of the law and whether it is applicable to this appeal. "So, too, where the plaintiff, after
the cmninencmnent of the action, has voluntarily done an
act

which makes

specific performance i1npossible,

through no fault of the defendant, the plaintiff is predwled frmn eontinning on hi8 action for specific performance."
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Taken literally, such staten1ent

IS

not applicable be-

cause plaintiff is not seeking a decree of specific perfonnance in pursuing this action, as noted in Point I
above. To the extent it conveys any meaning that no relief
including damages as an alternative, may be granted
in such a situation, it is applicable if the condition stated
of "through no fault of defendant" is satisfied. Of course,
the lower court did not attempt to determine fault in
this proceeding and this court can not prejudge it. Thus,
even if it finds support in the law (no authorities have
been cited to that effect), the essential condition to its
application has not been established. In addition it would
appear novel to require, which such statement appears to
imply, plaintiff to establish fault of defendant occurring

after complaint is filed against him, as well as before, in
order to pursue a remedy he had from the outset.
Appellant asserts such is not the law. Respondents acknowledge on page 8 of their brief that a plaintiff-seller
may commence a new action at law for damages after
selling the property so as to preclude the granting of
specific performance in a prior equity suit. Respondent
fails to offer any explanation as to why a new action may
be commenced for the relief prayed for here but an existing suit can not be prosecuted under such circumstances.
The trial court did not take the position now asserted
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by respondent that "an examination of plaintiff's pleadings reveals that the plaintiff proceeded in this action on
one theory and only one theory, that of specific performance." In fact the trial court originally considered it an
action for damages only (R 23).
Respondent would now support the dismissal with
prejudice on the grounds that plaintiff elected to stand
on a pleading for specific performance rather than
amending the pleadings to convert it into an action for
damages. This is curious inasmuch as the trial court extended to plaintiff an opportunity to pursue the first
alternative prayer of specific perfoflnance by abandoning
the alternative prayer for damages, which plaintiff refused to do (R 22, 23).
Plaintiff contends that no amendn1ent of the pleadings was essential. Technically the pleadings here could
not have been a1nended but only supple1nented by reason
of

development~

since the cmnplaint was filed. Respond-

ents argue that the failure to include a prayer for special
dmnages, which did not exist and were not ascertained
until after the connnence1nent of the action, for the comInission paid by plaintiff for the sale necessitated by defendants' breach of their contnwt was fatal. Ho·we·n'r, the
di~missal

with prejudiel' ·was not based on the failure of
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the pleadings to state a cause of action but on the pretrial court's view that under the facts of this case and
the holding of the Supreme Court in the case of Andre,ason v. Hansen, which was not even decided, at least
officially, at that time, that no cause of action existed
which could be properly pleaded by plaintiff. If, however,
respondent is correct in this positi~n, appellant respectfully submits that the lower court's dismissal should have
been without prejudice, since it would not have been on
the merits of the cause. Plaintiff could hardly have "stood
on his pleadings" to avoid the rule in the Andreason case
inasmuch as that case was not even decided at that time.
Can the dismissal with prejudice be founded upon
plaintiff's failure to pray for special damages 1 The special damages, if it truly is such, is the real estate commission paid by plaintiff in order to sell this property
and pay part of that commission. As to the attorney's
fees, it would certainly be imposing the need for impossible foresight to see that many months hence property
purchased by a defaulting buyer could be resold for the
contract price or more. If the right to attorney's fees is
so conditional, the assurance ass-umed by contracting
parties that the agreement can be enforced without cost
to the injured party is certainly illusory.
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Respondent's contention as to the prayer limiting the
amount of recovery (except in default cases) is clearly
contrary to the provision of Rule 54c(l) which states:
"Except as to a party against whmn a judgment is entered by default, every final judgment·· shall grant the
relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is
entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief
in his pleadings ... " Furthermore, our rules permit an
amendment even after judgment to conform to the evidence (R. 15 b). In addition, Rule 15(b) provides that
even failure to so amend after judgment does not effect
the result of a trial of issues. A1nendments during the
course of a trial are proper and had respondent here objected to :the introduction of testimony proving such
special damages as appellant's real estate commission for
reselling the property, it is hardly likely that the trial
court would even grant a continuance to permit the respondent to meet such evidence as a condition of such
amendment since he was already fully apprised of plaintiff's clain1 in this particular, except as to anwunt, by
reason of plaintiff's answer to respondent's interrogatory

#2 (R 11, R 13).
Undoubtedly the issue as to respondent's liability
!'or the real estate co1n1nission paid by plaintiff ·would
have been 1nade a part of the pre-trial order and any
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necessary or desirB.ble amendments made to the pleading
pursuant to Rule 16 had not the pre-trial judge immediately come to the conclusion that plaintiff had no cause
of action as a result of the holding in Andreason vs. Han-

sen) supra, which he knew would be announced in that
case by this Honorable· Court.
Counsel for respondent can hardly be unaware that
the court would be requested to award damages to plaintiff for the normal 5o/a real estate commission he had to
pay on $17,950.00 sale less the $450.00 he received in
addition to defendants' price and his attorney's feesand
court costs in this matter.
POINT III.
PLAINTIFF HAVING RETAINED THE EARNEST
MONEY SHOULD NOT BE BARRED FROM RECOVERY IN
AN ACTION AT LAW FOR DAMAGES EVEN IF THE DECISION OF ANDREASON v. HANSEN IS SOUND ON ITS
PARTICULAR FACTS.

The instant case is readily and properly distinguishable from that case for the following reasons:
1. In the Andreason case the property was resold
before the action for damages was commenced. In this
case an action to enforce the contract by specific performance or in the alternative for damages was commenced before the property was sold.
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2. The property here was not immediately resold
for a· much lesser mnount, but rather held for Inany
nwnths to obtain the highest possible price for it. Thus,
damages were reduced rather than increased by the plaintiff's subsequent sale.
3. Plaintiff here was not an attorney and held to
the higher standard expected of members of that honorable profession, at least in legal matters. (This is not to
imply that contractors are not also honorable.)
4. Plaintiff was not guilty of laying any "deceptive
nets," is not attempting any "over-reaching" in requesting his actual damages, and did not undertake to enforce
this contract "with vengence." -'- -- -

The cause should he remanded to the District Court
~~or

trial on the merits.
Very respectfully subnritted,

ROBERT B.

HANSE~

Attorney for Appelhwt
and Plaintiff

65 East ±th South
Salt Lake City, Utah
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